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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite ten years of democracy, gross inequities continue to permeate South African 
society, implying the need for emancipatory theory and practice.  Furthermore, despite a 
minority critical voice, South African Psychology, as elsewhere, has been a generally 
conservative discipline.  In this paper I explore how a radical plural feminism provides a 
resource for liberatory theory/practice.  Drawing on Foucauldian discourse and postcolonial 
insights, this framework performs a ‘both/and’ (rather than an ‘either/or’) function in the 
theorising and practice of diversity/unity and micro/macro-level politics. This theory is 
installed in practice through intellectual activism.  Intellectual activism implies in this 
context: refusing abstractions that pre-define who one is, while at the same time 
strategically deploying plural identities around contingent issues; working in the bordersites 
of dominant understandings; identifying, communicating and acting upon transversal 
relations of commonality; identifying and inhabiting the contradictions and disparities 
contained in dominant and oppressive discourses; and being constantly vigilant and 
reflective in terms of self, other, context, process, assumptions and theory. 
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The recent move to post-structuralist theorising/practice has meant that our 
conceptualisation of a dualism between theory and action has become untenable. Theory is 
always already a practice (whether in production, debate or reading), infused with power 
relations that centre around race, gender, class, ability, age and sexual orientation.  
Furthermore, practices are always already shot through with theory (at the very least 
assumptions about the nature of personhood, society, relationships, services etc.), whether 
this is tacit and unacknowledged or overt and acknowledged.  Therefore, in attempting to 
understand the relationship of theory to action we need to pose the question in a way that 
understands theory as a practice and practice as theory. Nevertheless, as with the 
individual/society divide with which Henriques et al (1984/1998) grappled, the 
theory/action dualism remains a complex one, with deconstructive efforts being 
counterbalanced by the seeming re-assertion of the dualism. 
 
How, then, are we to consider the relationship of theory to action and what is the role of 
theory in action? I believe that the starting point in considering these questions should be to 
specify and contextualise the action/theorising about which one is talking.  What are the 
ends of this specific practice of theorising or taking action and where is it located?  
Otherwise we risk (perhaps inadvertently) universalising practices of theorising and action 
where such universalism may be unfounded.  For this reason I have positioned this paper 
within the contradictory context of Psychology in post-Apartheid South Africa.  I have 
posed my central questions as:  How does a radical plural feminism that draws on 
Foucauldian and post-colonial theory provide a resource for emancipatory or liberatory 
analyses and practices in Psychology in post-Apartheid South Africa? And how does this 
theory as practice install itself in practice as theory? 
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My basic argument is this: While South Africa has one of the most progressive 
constitutions in the world (for example, gay rights are enshrined in the constitution) and a 
multi-party democratic system, gross inequities (such as access to land, water, employment, 
health services, and education) continue to exist.  These inequities tend (although not 
exclusively) to fracture along race and gender lines. Furthermore, post-Apartheid South 
Africa has, after the lifting of various forms of sanctions, been pulled further and further 
into the global network of post-capitalism, developmentalism, and neo-colonial cultural 
hegemony.  Within this context there is a need for the deployment within Psychology of 
theoretical resources that have liberatory effects not only within South Africa but also in 
terms of South Africa’s interpellation within the post-colonial, global community.  I believe 
that a radical plural feminism that draws on Foucauldian analytics of power and post-
colonialsm (see further explication of this framework later in the paper) provides such as 
resource as it: 
(1) Deconstructs the ‘centre’ as the normalised present, foregrounding the ‘periphery’ or 
the absent trace (e.g. those marginalised or else exoticised by mainstream psychological 
and political theory and practice), while at the same time avoiding the search for the 
myth of origin through totalising or essentialising the experience, mentality or 
subjectivity of the ‘Other’; 
(2) Theorises hybridity and multiplicity while not slipping into rampant relativism;  
(3) Challenges theoretical assumptions produced and circulated in well-resourced ‘first 
world’1 centres of psychological scholarship while avoiding calling into question the 
entire epistemological edifice generated there; 
(4) Attunes its pronouncements on liberatory practices and discourses to social and 
historical conditions; 
(5) Interlinks micro- and macro-level analyses and actions; 
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(6) Deploys multiple sources of resistance along chains of equivalence or transversal 
relations of commonality; 
(7) Replaces a unitary notion of gender identity with a dynamic, plural and relational model 
of subjectivity constructed within power relations.   
This theory as practice may be installed in practice as theory through intellectual activism 
(that takes a variety of forms). 
 
In fleshing out this argument, I, firstly, provide a thumb-nail sketch of challenges to 
mainstream Psychology in South Africa from the 1980s.  This will contextualise the need 
for a liberatory focus to psychological theorising in this country.  Secondly, I explore 
European and North American feminist critiques of Foucauldian analytics, as these 
critiques need to be taken into consideration in formulating a radical plural feminism that 
draws on Foucauldian theory. Thirdly, I argue that while these feminist debates concerning 
Foucauldian discourse provide some useful insights for South African feminists, what is 
missing from these discussions is the postcolonial problematic.  I discuss postcolonial 
writers’ engagements with Foucault and briefly outline a Foucauldian postcolonial radical 
plural feminism.  Finally, I discuss how intellectual activism forms the forward slash (/) of 
theory/practice in this particular instance.   
 
Challenges to psychological theorising and practice in South Africa 
 
South Africa is the African country in which the most engagement in the theory and 
practice in Psychology has taken place (Gilbert, 2000).  This is partially because of the 
country’s historical legacy of an extended form of colonialism in the form of a home-grown 
system of segregation and oppression (viz., Apartheid) and partially because of South 
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Africa’s relative wealth on the African continent. Psychology established itself in 
universities, industries, the health and education sectors and private practice at various 
times from the early 20th century.  Psychological research, teaching and practice have been, 
for the most part, conservative.  An a-political, value neutral model of research has been 
practised; curricula reflective of European and North American texts and courses have 
dominated the lecture halls; a private enterprise, individual intervention mode of practice 
has been adopted; specialist areas, such as Industrial and Educational Psychology, have 
served the interests of the white capitalist elite; and the category of professional 
psychologist has been and continues to be predominantly occupied by whites. There have, 
however, also been strong, minority voices challenging mainstream Psychological 
theory/practice and practice/theory.  Some of these challenges have been formulated within 
theories used by European and North American Psychology to critique Psychology’s 
endeavours in these contexts (e.g. Marxism, feminism, post-structuralism, Lacanian-based 
psychoanalysis).  Others have located their critiques within theories of Black 
Consciousness and post-colonialism.  
 
As pointed out by many post-structuralist writers, theory/practice is always contingent, 
historical and contextual.  In the following I trace some of the developments of a Critical 
South African Psychology since the 1980s within the political context of the time.  Of 
necessity this is an abbreviated version in which the richness of the debates around 
particular issues will not be reflected (see Painter & Terre Blanche, 2004, for a more 
comprehensive review). 
 
The 1980s were a time of brutal racial repression and political uprisings in South Africa.  
During this time, however, the lowest proportion of articles dealing with race appeared in 
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the South African Journal of Psychology.   This is probably because researchers adopted a 
value-free medical model of their research, thus ‘legitimately’ ignoring issues of race 
(Durrheim & Mokeki, 1997). Simultaneously, however, a group of psychologists began 
what came to be termed the relevance debate, in which the relevance of Psychology in the 
context of Apartheid South Africa was called into question. Psychological theory and 
practice were accused of ignoring the dialectical relationship between individuals and the 
socio-political context within which they live (Anonymous, 1987), and of adhering to a 
non-critical, conservative ideology which either actively or inadvertently supported 
Apartheid ideology (Dawes, 1985), ignored working class issues (Dawes, 1986), 
perpetuated inequities in mental health service provision (Vogelman, 1986), lacked 
constructs for dealing with the process of change, and viewed culture in a mechanistic 
manner (Gilbert, 1989). At the same time, certain forms of Community Psychology  (see 
Seedat, Cloete & Shochet, 1988) and what Painter and Terre Blanche (in press) refer to as 
‘proto-critical Social Psychology’ (e.g. the work of Don Foster & colleagues) emerged as 
sites of struggle against the practices of Apartheid and the mental health implications 
thereof.  Others argued for the continued relevance of certain clinical therapeutic skills 
(Perkel, 1988), for the maintenance of a division between political beliefs and scientific 
work (Biesheuvel, 1991) and for an authentic indigenous African Psychology, with 
‘Western’ Psychology being described as ‘impoverished in soul and poor in spirit’ 
(Holdstock, 1981, p. 128).  An ‘alternative’ or ‘oppositional’ journal, Psychology in 
Society, appeared for the first time in 1983, with an editorial masthead to critically explore 
the nature of theory and practice in Psychology in Apartheid and capitalist society.  Anti-
apartheid groupings like the Organisation for Appropriate Social Services in South Africa 
(OASSA), Psychologists Against Apartheid, and the South African Health and Social 
Services Organisation were formed.    
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 Early 1990 saw the release Nelson Mandela from prison and the beginning of the time of 
transition.  Publications relating to mental health practice and policy (steeped in the hope of 
providing equitable, primary mental health care to all) appeared.  An active promotion of an 
understanding of mental health as related to social policies, and the decentralization of 
mental health care were called for (e.g. Freeman, 1991; Freeman & De Beer, 1992; Pillay & 
Freeman, 1996). Articles dealing with race began to take a more political, critical stance 
(Durrheim & Mokeki, 1997).  Black psychologists (e.g. Manganyi, 1991; Nicholas, 1993; 
Nicholas & Cooper 1990), drawing from post-colonialism, Black Consciousness and Soviet 
Psychology, challenged both the liberal and socialist traditions in South African 
Psychology for their treatment of race and racism. For example, Manganyi (1991) stated 
that he had ‘little interest in the fashionable but sterile notion of a “relevant” psychological 
theory and practise … This form of intellectual tinkering in the past produced isolated 
interventions of the “Jim-comes-to-Jo’burg” variety, so-called cross-cultural explanations 
… [and] reinvent[ions] of the traditional healer’ (p. 120/1). 
 
The ‘miracle’ of the first democratic elections in 1994 saw the introduction of the Mandela 
era of reconciliation, with terms such as the ‘rainbow nation’ being coined.  The 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the ANC’s economic manifesto that 
emphasised basic needs provision and inclusive economic growth and development, was 
superseded in 1996 by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Policy (GEAR), which 
firmly entrenched neo-liberal orthodoxy aimed at the integration of the South African 
economy into the global market place (a shift that has been severely criticised by trade 
unions – Madisha, 2000).   Transformation became the key activity in a number of areas, 
including Psychology.  A new framework for practice was introduced by the Professional 
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Board2, and the Psychological Society of South Africa (PsySSA) was launched, integrating 
previous voluntary associations of psychologists and social service providers that were split 
along ideological and (mostly) racial lines.  Both these developments have, over the years, 
been subject to intense controversy, with legal action being taken in some instances.  In this 
period, two special editions of the South African Journal of Psychology appeared, one 
devoted to gender issues in Psychology and one to black scholarship (appearing in 1995 
and 1997 respectively).  These challenged the relative silence of South African Psychology 
on issues of gender and race.  
 
The Mbeki era (from 1999) is characterised by a focus on Black Economic Empowerment 
(chiefly aimed at large-scale private enterprise), a commitment to GEAR, and the 
strengthening of South Africa’s continental role primarily through the New Economic 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). While much has changed since 
democracy, much has remained the same, with poverty and inequities in wealth and 
resource distribution remaining primary problems.  Psychology reflects this.  On the one 
hand, psychologists continue to uncritically apply the value-neutral, scientific model of 
research and ‘Western’ oriented theories and practices (in particular medical aid focussed 
individual therapeutic models).  In a recent situational analysis of psychological research 
(Macleod, 2004) it was found that a minority of studies illuminate the interweaving of the 
individual with the socio-political context and that knowledge is being generated chiefly 
about urban, middle-class adults living in the three wealthiest provinces.  On the other 
hand, there has been a strengthening of what broadly could be called a Critical Psychology 
network in South Africa.  The annual Qualitative Methods conference (started in 1995) has 
become more prominent; some books (e.g. Duncan, Van Niekerk, De la Rey & Seedat, 
2001; Hook, Mkhize, Kiguwa & Collins, 2004) that interweave the personal with the 
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political have been published; and courses entitled Critical Psychology are being offered at 
a few universities.   
 
Various forms of social constructionism, post-modernism and post-structuralism have 
become popular theoretical resources from which critical psychologists in South Africa 
have drawn.  Academics and practitioners have been attracted to these approaches as they 
are attentive to power relations, and deconstruct dominant understandings of being human, 
allowing space for the Other3. The multiple points of diffraction around which ‘Other-ness’ 
is constructed (gender, race, class, and sexual orientation and, within these, site of living, 
access to basic amenities, means of survival, ability, and age) and the power relations 
contingent upon these, are highly visible in the South African context. Levett & Kottler 
(1997), for example, argue that in South Africa the category of gender is too simple, and 
hence feminism is too simple.  
 
Yet while these theoretical turns, together with discourse analysis, represent somewhat of a 
growth industry in South African Critical Psychology, there have also been debates about 
the usefulness of these paradigms (see, for example, the exchanges between Van Staden 
(1998) and Terre Blanche (1998) and between Painter and Theron (2001a; 2001b) and 
Durrheim (2001)).  In this paper I wish to explore the link between a specified type of post-
structuralism, which draws on Foucauldian analytics of power4, and emancipatory practice.  
I agree with Mouffe (1995) that the conflation of post-modernism (and social 
constructionism) with post-structuralism has been unhelpful and has led to confusion in 
feminist debates.  Even within these broad theoretical fields there is a range of 
conversations and practices, as pointed out by Kenneth Gergen (1998) with regard to social 
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constructionism.  For these reasons, I advocate greater specificity of theoretical foundations 
in the discussions on theory and practice5.    
 
The need to infuse post-colonial insights into Foucauldian-based feminist 
analytics 
 
Foucauldian analytics have been received with varying degrees of enthusiasm amongst 
feminists.  His work has been seen by some feminists as fertile ground for feminist analyses 
and action.  This is largely because he shared with feminist thinking a concern with 
sexuality as a key area of political struggle; with expanding the political to include 
everyday social domination; critiquing biological determinism, humanism, and the search 
for a scientific ‘truth’; and undermining the modern conceptualisation of the rational 
subject (McNay, 1992).  Others, however, see Foucauldian analytics as incompatible with 
feminist theory. In the following section I discuss these critiques as they need careful 
consideration in the exposition of a Foucauldian-informed, radical plural feminism.  
 
I want to point out, however, that these critiques and the responses to them (outlined below) 
emanate chiefly from European and North American feminists.  I argue that while these 
discussions provide some useful theoretical insights for African feminists, for a number of 
reasons they are insufficient in the task of theorising and practising feminisms in the South 
African context.  Firstly, the socio-historical circumstances of the rise of feminisms in 
South Africa differs from that in Europe and America.  Certainly, there has been a fair 
amount of strategic usage or appropriation of feminist ideas and practices generated in 
‘Western’ contexts but, importantly, South African and African women’s movements and 
feminisms have emerged chiefly out of women’s engagement in national liberation 
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struggles (although African feminists have asserted that African women’s resistance and 
activism against asymmetrical gender power relations pre-dates colonialisation – Guy-
Sheftall, 2003).  This has created a tension for South African and African feminisms in that 
the criticism of African gender relations is seen by some as potentially weakening Africa’s 
resistance to neo-colonialism (Arndt, 2002).  Secondly, while some feminists located in 
‘First World’ resourced contexts recognise the politics of their location (see, for example, 
Burman, 1998), all too frequently the former colonies or ‘Third World’ act as the 
suppressed absent trace6 to the pre-occupations of the gender-race-class relations of the 
‘First World’.  Roth (2003) asserts that this has been equally true for US-based black 
feminisms.  There is little acknowledgement of the manner in which the ‘periphery’ (the 
colonies, the ‘Third World’) inhabits and defines the ‘metropole’ (the parent country, the 
‘First World’).  This relationship is historical, material (e.g. structural adjustment 
programmes that are imposed on ‘developing countries’ by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund; sweatshops located in poor countries) and discursive (the 
‘developed’ world only has meaning in relation to the ‘developing’ world).  Thirdly, where 
‘Third World’ women do appear in the theorising of Euro-American scholars, they are 
frequently homogenized into a single category (see Mohanty’s (1991) analysis of this), or 
have been excavated as a resource for ‘Western’ theory (Lal, 1999).  Lastly, the social 
realities of South Africa’s history of racialised political repression and oppression, struggle 
politics, exile and return, and current issues around HIV/AIDS, land rights disputes, 
developmentalism (in the socio-economic sense), continental militarization and political 
instability together with refugee-ism, global capitalism, poverty, and neo-colonialism (in 
addition to the challenges of heterosexuality, racism, class struggle, and domestic violence) 
imply an added complexity of feminist theorising and activism concerning the history and 
current circumstances of gender relations in the South African (and African) contexts.  For 
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these reasons, I believe that post-structural feminism in South Africa should be infused with 
post-colonial insights that draw on and extend Foucault.  
 
Feminist critiques of Foucault 
 
In terms of his actual analyses, Foucault has been accused of covert androcentricity in some 
of his work.  For example, in his work on prisons, he did not consider how the treatment of 
male and female prisoners differed (Soper, 1993). At an epistemological level, feminist 
critiques centre around two main concerns, viz. nihilism and relativism.  These, in turn, lead 
to charges that Foucauldian analytics leave no space for emancipatory practice and for 
macro-level structures of domination to be analysed or undermined (Balbus, 1988; 
Deveaux, 1999; Harding, 1992; Hartsock, 1990, Hawkesworth, 1989).   
 
Foucault is accused of being nihilistic as he does not provide criteria by which to judge 
either one regime of truth as superior to another, or societies or relations as better or worse 
than each other.  This means that there is no standpoint from which to engage in 
emancipatory politics and nothing to strive for.  Since power is everywhere, it is ultimately 
nowhere making it impossible to distinguish between malign and benign forms of power.  
This makes social improvement impossible, as successful resistance means simply 
changing one discursive identity for another, thus creating new oppressions.  Foucauldian 
discourse risks sliding into depoliticised relativism where every viewpoint becomes equally 
valid and true.  There is no indication of what action follows from analysis as there is no 
normative or theoretical basis for making political judgement or statements.   
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Post-colonial engagements with Foucault 
 
As with feminists, many post-colonial writers have been critical of post-structuralist theory, 
overtly rejecting it as a ‘Western’ model of critique.  Others have constructively engaged 
with Foucault, seeing Foucault as useful because his genealogies of the ‘West’ provide a 
powerful critique of the rule of modernity that the colonies experienced in a peculiar form. 
For example, Prakash (1995) notes, with regard to India, that the power of ‘Western’ 
discourses operates through their (‘Western’ discourses) authorization and deployment by 
the nation-state, while in the ‘West’, Orientalist discourse plays a ‘vital role in projecting 
the First World as the radiating centre around which others are arranged’ (p. 89).  He 
believes that it is for this reason that Foucault’s (and Derrida’s) critiques of ‘Western’ 
thought intersect with postcolonial criticism. 
 
Edward Said stands out as the theorist who initially deployed Foucauldian insights in a 
post-colonialist project (most notably in Orientalism).  Said (1993) acknowledges his 
indebtedness to Foucault (in particular Foucault’s genealogies), but critiques him for the 
ignoring imperialism in his work.  Said takes up this challenge, asserting that Orientalism 
represents a colonial discourse that is deployed in the management of colonial and post-
colonial relations.  Said’s relationship with Foucauldian analytics shifted over time, 
however.  As with the feminists mentioned above, he became increasingly sceptical of 
Foucault’s micro-physics of power and the possibility of resistance within this framework 
(Kennedy, 2000). 
 
While Said’s work is an important starting point for a Foucauldian-based understanding of 
post-colonialism, there are also difficulties with his use of Foucault. He has been accused of 
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drawing on the conflicting methodologies of Foucault, Gramsci and humanism, and of 
representing Orientalism as always and everywhere the same, in contradistinction to 
Foucault’s model of discourse as entailing multiple (at times contradictory) institutional and 
discursive practices  (Kennedy, 2000).  Bhabha (1994) takes up the last point, utilising the 
concepts of heterogeneity, hybridity and mimicry in response to what he calls the 
‘underdeveloped’ sections of Orientalism (see later discussion).  As with Foucault, Said is 
accused of gender blindness (e.g. assuming similitude between male and female colonial 
travellers) and of not considering that women may speak for themselves (Kennedy, 2000). 
 
Various post-colonial authors have employed Foucauldian analyses within African settings.  
For example, Stoler creates a conversation with Foucault’s (1978) The History of Sexuality 
Vol. 1, extending Foucault’s thoughts with an analysis of the concepts and policies of 
imperial racism. Vaughan (1991) traces the history of European medicine in African 
societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Within South Africa, feminists such as 
Levett (1989), Wilbraham (1996, 1997), Shefer (1999) and I (Macleod, 2001, 2002, 2003a, 
2003b, in press; Macleod & Durrheim, 2002a, 2003) have grounded analyses of child 
sexual abuse, discourses on sex and marriage in advice columns, heterosexual relationships, 
and teenage pregnancy in Foucauldian analytics. In his genealogical study of socio-medical 
discourses regarding the African body in South Africa, Butchart (1998) traces the course of 
missionary medicine, mining medicine, sanitary science, social medicine and community 
health.   
 
There has been some controversy concerning how Foucault has been taken up in South 
Africa.  For example, Butchart (1998) admits in his genealogy that there is a diversity of 
readings of Foucault (and hence that a range of methodologies is possible).  However, he is 
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less tolerant of this in an earlier article (Butchart, 1997).  Here he asserts that Foucault has 
received a limited and distorted reception in South African socio-medical sciences.  The 
distortion he refers to is the attempt by some authors to press Foucault into liberal-humanist 
or Marxist directions.  While I agree that this is true of some of the examples he quotes (e.g. 
Dawes, 1986), his reading of others (e.g. Wilbraham, 1996, 1997) does a disservice to the 
incisiveness of the Foucauldian analyses deployed in this work7. 
 
Foucauldian post-colonial radical plural feminisms 
 
As seen above, feminist and post-colonial writers’ responses to Foucault have been varied, 
with even the critiques at times contradictory.  For example, contrary to the accusation of 
relativism, Spivak (1988) accuses Foucault of utopianism.  These differences in response 
have largely to do with particular interpretations of Foucault’s work, and the period of his 
writing upon which authors focus.  Foucault’s early works centred on the analysis of 
historically situated systems of institutions and discursive practices. His methodological 
treatise, the Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 1972) attempted to work out a theory of 
rule-governed systems of discursive practices.  In his genealogical work (e.g. Discipline 
and Punish (Foucault, 1977) and The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1 (Foucault, 1978)) he 
isolated components of present-day political technologies and traced them back in time, 
concentrating on the relations of power, knowledge and the body in modern society.  These 
genealogical studies tended to focus on the micro-physics of power, hence the feminist 
objections raised above. His interviews, which he viewed as part of his work, focussed 
more specifically on the political nature of his work than did his books, which he saw as 
historical treatises (Deveaux, 1999).  In his series of lectures in 1978 on governmentality 
(Foucault, 1991; Gordon, 1991) Foucault argued that the same style of analysis which he 
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used to study the installation of power in everyday relations and practices could be applied 
to techniques and practices of governing populations of subjects. In his last works, Foucault 
(1985, 1986) turned his attention to the formation of subjectivity, and what he called the 
‘techniques of the self’.   
 
In this section I discuss some responses to the critiques outlined above, and propose a 
radical plural feminism that is based on Foucauldian theory infused with post-colonial 
insights.  I have borrowed the term ‘radical plural feminism’ from Sawicki (1991) who 
discusses Foucault in relation to feminism.  The feminism proposed is radical in 
contradistinction to liberal notions of multiplicity and plural as it takes into account 
diversity (within a chain of equivalence – see later discussion).  
 
It is true that Foucault was reluctant to delineate a clear-cut political agenda because of his 
sense of the dangers of programmes based on grand theory.  However, his writings were 
clearly political.  Determining the liberatory status of any discourse, for Foucault, is not a 
matter of theoretical or political pronouncement based on meta-narratives.  Rather, these 
determinations are a matter of social and historical inquiry (Sawicki, 1988).  For example, 
he observed that psychoanalysis played a liberating role in relation to psychiatry, but as a 
global theory it has contributed to forms of social control and normalisation. Similarly, in 
South Africa, there is a small, but active natural childbirth movement that attempts to wrest 
reproduction from the oppressive effects of its medicalisation and return it to the home.  On 
the other hand, maternal deaths in certain areas (particularly former homelands) are high 
owing to poor or non-existent health-care facilities8.  Here the lack of choice to access 
health-care when in need is oppressive and lobbying for increased quality and quantity of 
medical facilities liberatory. 
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 The acknowledgement of the social and historical contingency of emancipatory discourses 
and practices does not mean a slide into rampant relativism or a postmodern pastiche 
opposing imperial grand narratives.  Lather (1992) points out that those writers who accuse 
Foucault of relativism do so from a modernist definition in which relativism is an evil to be 
avoided at all costs, as this means giving up all notions of truth, falsity and rationality.  The 
notion of relativity assumes a foundational structure or Archimedian standpoint.  From a 
Foucauldian perspective, the definition of knowledge as absolute or relative is 
misconceived.  However, in rejecting a search for absolute grounding, Foucauldian 
analytics does not reverse the binary opposition and advocate relativity.  Instead, the 
absolute/relative opposition is collapsed. While knowledge is seen as contextual and 
historical, notions of truth are not abandoned – they merely cease to take on the aspect of 
absolute Truth.   
 
Foucault’s asserts that power does not exist in a bipolar form. Instead it is ‘employed and 
exercised through a net-like organisation’ (Foucault, 1980, p. 98).  Furthermore, power is 
not localised in a particular institution or person nor can it be appropriated as a commodity.  
Thus within a radical plural feminism, the bipolar position of men or colonialists as 
possessing power and women and the colonized as powerless ceases to be an option.  
Instead, we are all enmeshed in power relations that are neither stable nor unitary.  This 
does not, however, mean that there is no domination.  While men’s and ‘white’s’ 
enmeshment in the patchwork of patriarchal and neo-colonial power can be acknowledged, 
this does not mitigate the fact that they have a higher stake in maintaining institutional and 
domestic power relations within which they occupy dominant positions.  Thus in a radical 
plural feminism, the commonality around gendered relations remains, but one strategy of 
 
 18 
resistance is not privileged over another.  Indeed, Foucault insisted on the multiplicity of 
sources of resistance.  There is ‘no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt’, but 
rather shifting points of resistance that ‘inflame certain parts of the body, certain moments 
in life’ (Foucault, 1978, p. 96).   
 
Resistance is possible through reverse or subjugated discourses that seek to subvert 
hegemonic discourses.  ‘It it through the re-appearance of this knowledge, of these local 
popular knowledges, these disqualified knowledges, that criticism performs its work’ 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 96).  The ‘centre’ becomes de-stablised or de-totalised through the 
insertion of the ‘periphery’ (in its multiplicity).  Bhabha’s (1994) notions of mimicry and 
hybridity have pertinence here.  Mimicry is when the colonized rewrite colonial discourse, 
thereby turning that discourse into a hybrid product.  It is essentially a deconstructive 
practice, whereby the colonized, through language and practice, reveal the contradictions 
and inconsistencies in colonial discourse and utilise this as an in-between space for 
resistance and subversion.  An example within Psychology is the work of Manganyi (1973, 
1991), one of the first trained black clinical psychologists in South Africa, who wrote about 
the psychological experience (colonial discourse) of black people from a Black 
Consciousness perspective (hybrid product).  
 
Foucault (1982), in a paper entitled ‘The Subject and Power’, proposes a ‘new economy of 
power relations’ in which the starting point is the forms of resistance that oppose the effects 
of power/knowledge and refuse abstractions which determine who one is.  These forms of 
resistance are transversal, but also immediate in that they focus on issues closest to hand. 
The implication of this ‘both/and’ (rather than ‘either/or’) reasoning (transversal and 
immediate) in terms of radical plural feminism is that feminist political practice becomes a 
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matter of alliances rather than one of unity around a universally shared interest. Unitary 
notions of gender identity are replaced with plural and complexly constructed conceptions 
of social identity (Allen & Baber, 1992).  Refusal of foreclosed identities (e.g. women as a 
single oppressed class across space and time) within transversal relations of commonality 
(e.g. oppressive practices centring around reproduction) becomes possible.  Thus, within 
this politics of difference, the aim is not to overcome differences in order to achieve a 
political unity, but rather to use difference as a resource around which to establish multiple 
points of resistance to the myriad of relations of inequality and domination. 
 
Some feminists have expressed concern that the movement away from viewing women as a 
single oppressed class across space and time has resulted in the total displacement of the 
category women and therefore the impossibility of feminist political action.  While in a 
radical plural feminism, based on Foucault, the multiple and contingent nature of 
subjectivity is recognised, this does not mean an equitable plurality of subject positions.  
Instead, as Mouffe (1995) puts it, there is ‘the constant subversion and overdetermination of 
one by others, which make possible the generation of “totalizing effects” within a field 
characterized by open and indeterminate frontiers’ (p. 318).  Women cease being a coherent 
group, but are linked in a chain of equivalence that articulates political issues related not 
only to gender but also racism, classism, neo-colonialism, heterosexism etc.   
 
An excellent example of this chain of equivalence is seen in the post-colonial feminist 
writer Mohanty’s (1999) work, in which she examines two instances of the incorporation of 
women into the global economy (women lacemakers in India and women in the electronics 
industry in the United States).  Her work indicates that despite obvious geographical and 
sociocultural differences between these women, particular gendered readings allow for 
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them to be positioned in very similar ways.  The chain of equivalence in this case centred 
around women’s identity as workers being constructed as secondary to their familial and 
domestic roles.  This type of gendered reading, Mohanty points out, is predicated on local 
and transnational patriarchal and racial hierarchies. A Southern African example is the 
colloquium on ‘Instituting Gender Equality in Schools: Working in an HIV/AIDS 
Environment’ with researchers, educators, HIV/AIDS workers, gender activists and non-
governmental organisation workers in attendance.  At this colloquium (papers are published 
in Agenda, Vol. 53), a need to create space for alternative views, to avoid seeing youth as a 
homogeneous group, and to craft interventions to suit the specificity of local context was 
recognised.  However, within this diversity, a chain of equivalence was identified as the 
centrality of gender in discourse and practice surrounding sexuality and HIV/AIDS (Burns, 
2002).   Thus, in radical plural feminism, while multiple points of intervention and 
resistance are established according to pertinent social and historical circumstances, 
commonality around chains of equivalence or transversal relations of power prevents 
feminism from slipping into rampant relativism. 
 
Within radical plural feminism, feminist critique need forswear neither large historical 
narratives (say, of patriarchy) nor analyses of societal macrostructures (e.g. sexism).  
However, theory must be historical and attuned to the ‘cultural’ and group specificity.  This 
interlinkage (between the micro- and macro-level) is made possible by Foucault’s 
governmental analyses.  Although Foucault initially concentrated on micro-strategies and 
power at its capilliary points, he never denied (contrary to some feminists’ reading of his 
work) that these are taken up in global or macrostrategies of domination.  He merely 
refused to privilege a centre of power and conducted an ‘ascending analysis of power’ 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 99).  Later, in his lectures on governmentality Foucault extended these 
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analyses, attempting to ‘cut the Gordian knot of the relation between micro- and macro-
levels of power’ (Dean, 1994, p. 179) by applying the same kind of analysis at the macro-
level that he had previously applied at the micro-level – one that emphasises the practices 
of government.   
 
Foucault (1991) used the terms government and governmentality in inter-related ways.  He 
defined government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ – an activity (at macro-level) that aims to 
shape, guide of affect the behaviour, actions or comportment of people (at the micro-level).  
This concerns the interweaving of the relation of the self with the self, private interpersonal 
relations which involve some sort of control or guidance, relations within social 
institutions, and relations concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty (Gordon, 
1991). Governmentality he viewed as the rationality or art of government, which he 
explained as a way or system of knowing and thinking about the nature of the practice of 
government.  Governmentality is a complex system, exercised through an ensemble of 
institutions, procedures, analyses, reflections, calculations and tactics.  The development of 
the science of government emerged in response to (1) the re-centring of the economy on a 
different plane from that of the family, and (2) the emergence of the problem of the 
population. The family disappeared as a model of government and as the site of production.  
Instead, population (macro-level), its welfare, the improvement of its wealth and health, its 
capacity to wage war and engage in labour, etc. became the goal of government.  The 
family (micro-level), however, became central to the macro-level as it emerged as ‘an 
element internal to population, and as a fundamental instrument in its government’ 
(Foucault, 1991, p. 99). A colleague and I (Macleod & Durrheim, 2002b) have argued 
elsewhere that feminist-informed governmental analyses may provide the intellectual 
grounds for holding diversity within commonality (i.e. making the links between micro-
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level practices and strategies of resistance and macro-level concentrations power, e.g. 
patriarchy).   
 
Radical plural feminism is distinct from liberal pluralism and the neo-colonial notion of 
multiculturalism (see Beckett & Macey (2001) regarding the oppressive effects of 
multiculturalism).  In the latter, diversity becomes a matter of personal identity, that is to be 
accepted, understood and tolerated, thus masking power relations (e.g. in the form of the 
normalised absent person doing the accepting and tolerating, and the inequities inherent in 
the class, caste, race, gender, religious, ethnic, sexual orientation and national 
differentiations).  Radical plural feminism operates within a dynamic, plural, relational 
model of identity formed in a context of power relations (Sawicki, 1991).  Thus there is a 
recognition that differentiation is almost always an imbalanced process, with, as Prakash 
(1995) puts it, ‘the recognition that the functioning of colonial power [and not merely its 
effects] was heterogeneous’ (p. 96, emphasis in the original).   
 
The bridges: intellectual activism and political reflections 
 
I return in this final section to the question of the relationship between theory and practice.  
How does theory as practice install itself in practice as theory?  What happens at the 
forward slash (/) of theory/action?  Specifically, in term of the radical plural feminism 
discussed above, I believe that this space is occupied by intellectual activism. 
 
Earlier, we saw how Foucault privileged the re-appearance of disqualified, peripheral 
knowledge in modes of resistance.  This is, in essence, intellectual activism, not necessarily 
carried out by the acknowledged intellectual or academic, but also by the activist who 
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understands oppression from within.  In terms of radical plural feminism, intellectual 
activism implies a number of practices. 
 
Firstly, it implies refusing abstractions that pre-define who one is, while at the same time 
strategically deploying plural identities around contingent issues.  For example, activists 
from South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign (which describes itself as a grassroots 
movement for HIV treatment literacy) actively undermine definitions of themselves as sick 
or as victims.  At the same time, they have strategically deployed the identities of poor 
women infected with HIV and women with no choice in their campaign to force the South 
African government to offer treatment to prevent mother to child transmission of HIV. 
 
Secondly, intellectual activism means identifying and inhabiting the contradictions and 
disparities contained in dominant and oppressive discourses, thereby creating hybrid 
spaces.  For example, in ‘The Johannesburg Statement on Sexual Orientation, Gender 
Identity, and Human Rights’ (www.hrw.org/lgbt/pdf/joburg_statement021304.htm), a 
coalition of African lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender organisations call on African 
governments to support a resolution before the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights.  In the statement, they foreground their status as the feared Other (‘That we are 
targets of … abuse proves that we exist – states do not persecute phantoms or ghosts’ – see, 
for example, Robert Mugabe’s vociferous denial of African homosexuality).  In their appeal 
to African governments, they occupy notions of African democracy, African communal 
interrelatedness and interdependency and a time before ‘colonialism cast its stultifying 
shadow’ (all of which are familiar political discourse in Africa) to create a space for their 
statement ‘We have and have always had a place in Africa’. 
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Thirdly, it is the task of the intellectual activist to identify, communicate and act upon 
transversal relations of commonality or chains of equivalence.  Identification and 
communication may take on a number of forms, including: comparative research (see 
Mohanty’s research discussed above); fostering spaces (public lectures, workshops, 
colloquia, seminars and conferences at local, national and international level) for 
continuous debate that marks multiplicity but also chains of equivalence; and publications 
in various forms (newspapers, professional magazines, pamphlets, web-sites, and manuals, 
journals).  Actions along chains of equivalence stemming from this identification and 
communication may also take on various forms that are familiar territory for the gender 
activist (marches, lobbying, advocacy, legal challenges etc.).  The Johannesburg Statement 
discussed above represents one such action based on communication emanating from a 
conference. 
 
Fourthly, intellectual activism implies working in the bordersites of dominant 
understandings, thus allowing for the dislodging of these understandings.  For example, in 
my work on teenage pregnancy I have indicated how the dominant understanding of 
teenage pregnancy as a social problem is linked to taken-for-granted assumptions 
concerning adolescence, race, family formation, mothering, and (hetero)sexuality.  
Intellectual activism means, in some senses, choosing marginality as a site of resistance (for 
example, choosing to work in less resourced environments or to investigate issues relating 
to poverty or to identify oneself as a feminist).  This is in contradistinction to marginality 
that is imposed (although the overlaps are clear, with the latter, at times, providing 
opportunities for subversion into the former).  As noted earlier, this does not mean 
returning to gross culturalism or relativism, but rather that strategic aims are taken at the 
assumptions inherent in dominant (and marginalised) discourses.  Simultaneously the 
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methodologies of the ‘centre’ (e.g. the use of quantitative data to highlight concerns around 
women’s access to primary health care facilities) are utilised to local advantage.   
 
Finally, intellectual activism implies being constantly vigilant and reflective in terms of 
self, other, context, process, assumptions and theory.  Much of the discussion concerning 
this practice has gone under the rubric of reflexivity.  In this, the multiple and socially 
constructed interactive and reflexive positionings of practitioners, researchers, academics 
and participants along the axes of race, gender, class, ability, sexual orientation and religion 
are acknowledged and deconstructed.  There is a danger, however, of this exercise slipping 
into a (at times guilt-ridden) confession of the intellectual’s positioning or their emotional 
investments.  This kind of reflexivity may lead to a ‘dizzying regress to residual, difficult to 
comprehend factors like repression and desire’ (Squire, 1995, p. 157), or may attribute 
‘fictive’ status to the work as the subjectivity of interpretation is made prominent (Parker & 
Burman, 1993).  
 
An analysis of the ‘politics of location’ and the ‘politics of representation’ seems to 
overcome these difficulties.  Lal (1999), for example, continues to pay careful attention to 
the multiple, contradictory subject positionings of herself and the participants in her 
research.  However, her analysis of the politics of location as the epistemic privilege of 
academic discourse, the presumed authenticity of native accounts, and the political 
intellectual location within which we choose to position ourselves (e.g. feminist, 
anticolonial, antiracist) moves her reflexive account beyond a scrutiny of individual 
subjectivity.  Mohanty (1995) defines the politics of location as the ‘historical, 
geographical, cultural, psychic and imaginative boundaries which provide the ground for 
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political definition and self-definition for contemporary … feminists’ (p. 67).  Again the 
intersection of the social and poltical with the individual is evident. 
 
The politics of representation is complex. There is inevitably a fissure that exists between 
the intellectual and the women whom s/he thinks she represents or portrays in her/his 
writing.  Whatever marginality within which the intellectual is interactively positioned or 
chooses to position herself, s/he remains an intellectual, distanced from those who have not 
undergone the process and rigour of intellectual debate and argument.  Attendant on this is 
the class status that academia bestows on people.  This alerts us to Spivak’s (1988) famous 
conclusion that the subaltern woman is allowed no discursive position from which to speak 
herself, as her voice is always already inhabited by masculinist and colonial discourse.  
Some postcolonial critics have questioned this, arguing that the subaltern may have more 
agency than Spivak allows, as the ‘dominant culture’ is intricately intertwined with the 
‘Other’, thereby constructing themselves in relation to each other (Holton, 2003).  
Representation thus does not imply overcoming differences to evidence the true, authentic 
experience of women in a particular situation.  Rather, it is recognising that representation 
is a process in which the discourses invoked by the intellectual and those invoked by the 
women in question meet, challenge, dovetail, diverge, and generally construct new, hybrid 
understandings. 
 
Conclusion 
 
South African Psychology has, in many respects, has an ignominious past, bolstering both 
Apartheid ideals and the capitalist elite.  From the 1980s (and somewhat before) voices of 
opposition within Psychology have become stronger.  However, Feminist Psychology in 
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South Africa remains marginal, appearing mostly as an approach within the rather diffuse 
category of Critical Psychology.  This peripheral status reflects the marginalization of 
gender issues in national and provincial politics (although a number of statutory bodies, 
such as the Gender Commission and the Office of the Status of Women exist, the structural 
constraints within which these bodies operate means that their impact is frequently limited, 
with gender issues often being viewed as a gross number game). 
 
The implication for feminist psychologists in South Africa is that we need to engage in 
more intellectual activism, which not only fore-grounds feminist theory but also feminist 
practice.  We need to uncover and resist the patchwork of patriarchies that draw on racial, 
class, sexual orientation, age, ability and other social vectors.  I have suggested in this paper 
that a theoretical resource for this is radical plural feminism that draws on Foucauldian and 
postcolonial insights.  There is a growing debate about feminisms in Africa (as evidenced in 
the three special editions of the journal Agenda (2001, 2002, 2003), entitled African 
feminisms), and a recognition that the differential impact on women of sexism, classism, 
racism, colonialism and heterosexism means that feminist practice has to be a politics of 
alliance along a chain of equivalences and differences rather than one of unity around a 
shared unitary gender identity and shared social relations. 
   
Notes 
 
1. I use inverted commas here to denote the problematics around deploying terms such 
as ‘Western’, ‘First World’, ‘Third World’, and even ‘periphery’ and ‘metropole’.  
These terms imply the homogenisation of thought and action emanating from 
particular regions, and the construction of an entity as ‘real’ apart from the relations 
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of power that constitute it.  But, as pointed out by Said (1997), it is equally difficult to 
avoid these terms.  I therefore continue to deploy these terms but in a deconstructed, 
non-essentialised form that recognises their constructed, socially heterogeneous and 
historically contingent nature. 
2. This policy framework has gone through a number of revisions with many of the 
initial proposals (e.g. the requirement of a doctorate for registration as a psychologist) 
eventually being abandoned. 
3. As with other post-colonial writers, I use ‘Other’ to mean the excluded or 
marginalised subject.  I utilise the capitalised form to denote the abstract, generalized 
representation of this subject. 
4. As with other theorists, I have found that Derrida complements Foucauldian analytics 
in post-structuralist feminist analyses.  However, given space limitation, I shall not 
explore this aspect in this paper. 
5. M. Gergen (2001) provides a useful exposition of post-modernism in feminist theory. 
6. I use absent trace in the Derridean sense, viz. the marginalised or subordinated term in 
a binary opposition. 
7. Butchart applauds Wilbraham for seeing subjectivity as the end result rather than the 
origin of discourse, but accuses her of failing to recognise that discourse and 
discursive regimes are the outcome of disciplinary fabrication.  The causal type of 
understanding of Foucault (disciplinary technology results in discourse which results 
in subjectivity) that allows for this critique is, in my view, itself problematic. 
8. The Department of Health estimates that national Maternal Mortality Ratio as 150 
deaths per 100 000 live births.  They state that there are ‘stark differences in the 
maternal mortality by population group, which is strongly suggestive of socio-
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economic status differences and differing levels of access to care’ 
(www.doh.gov.za/docs/reports.mothers) 
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